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COVERAGE ISSUES UNDER COMMERCIAL
GENERAL LIABILITY AND DIRECTORS'
AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY POLICIES
JOSEPH

P.

MONTELEONE*

INTRODUCTION

As many lawyers and business people are all too acutely aware,
employment-related litigation has been burgeoning over the past
few years as various pieces of federal and state legislation have
been enacted. This legislation has significantly expanded the rights
and remedies available to aggrieved employees. Not surprisingly,
after appreciating the heightened liability and damages exposures
in this area, one's thoughts may tum to whether or not there is in
surance coverage available for these exposures. About four years
ago, insurers introduced a liability insurance product which has
come to be known generically as Employment Practices Liability
Insurance ("EPLI"). Unlike the other insurance policies that will
be discussed in this article, EPLI is in a sense the first insurance
product specifically intended by insurers to provide coverage for
employment-related perils such as discharge from employment,
workplace discrimination, and sexual harassment. The notoriety
that has attended these perils, exemplified by events such as the
confirmation hearings for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas
in the fall of 1991, and the $7.2 million jury verdict in California in
the summer of 1994 against a major law firm arising from sexual
harassment, has served only to exacerbate interest in the insurance
issues in this area.
This Article will focus upon the extent that coverage may be
* Joseph P. Monteleone is Senior Vice President and Claims Counsel for Reli
ance National. The opinions expressed herein are personal to the author and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of Reliance National or of any insurance company in the
Reliance Insurance Group. Further, the author, through these materials, does not pur
port to restate, explain or interpret any policy of insurance issued by a member com
pany in the Reliance Insurance Group.
While the information contained in these materials is believed to be accurate and
authoritative, it is not intended to be a substitute for specific legal, insurance, or other
professional advice. The reader should consult legal and/or insurance professionals for
advice or assistance on specific issues of interest.
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available under certain liability insurance policies, other than EPLI,
for employment-related claims. Specifically, the policies to be ex
amined are commercial general liability ("CGL") and commercial
umbrella covers and directors' and officers' liability ("D&O").
I.

CGL AND UMBRELLA COVERAGE

Virtually all businesses carry a general liability insurance policy
which, dependent upon the size of the business entity and its risk
management needs, may be augmented by layers of excess and/or
umbrella policies. 1 Except as otherwise may be provided pursuant
to a "personal injury" coverage part to the policy, the CGL policy
only provides coverage only for claims that: (i) allege bodily injury
or damage to tangible property and (ii) arise from an "occurrence"
as defined in the policy.
A.

The Bodily Injury Trigger

CGL policies typically cover bodily injury, defined as "bodily
injury, sickness or disease." Most wrongful employment claims do
not involve physical bodily injury, although one can imagine such
injury in connection with a claim of sexual harassment or a non
genteel employment discharge. Can such claims, which usually fea
ture allegations solely of emotional distress and/or mental anguish,
ever constitute "bodily injury" so as to invoke CGL coverage?
The courts are sharply split on this issue. One view is that,
absent physical symptoms or manifestation of emotional distress,
claims for emotional distress alone do not constitute bodily injury.
As one court stated, "[b]odily injury ... is a narrow term and en
compasses only physical injuries to the body and the consequences
thereof.'~2 In many jurisdictions therefore, allegations of purely
1. The discussion in this paper with regard to the CGL policy applies to both

excess and umbrella policies. Simply put, an excess policy typically "follows fonn" of
the underlying primary CGL policy, i.e., it adopts the same tenns, conditions, and other
provisions of the primary policy but does not apply until or unless the underlying insur
ance is exhausted by claim exposures. An umbrella policy also operates in excess of a
primary policy but provides broader protection in certain areas. To the extent coverage
exists under an umbrella policy that does not exist under the primary policy, the um
brella will typically "drop down" and operate as primary insurance.
2. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Diamant, 401 Mass. 654, 656, 518 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (1988).
See also Greenman v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 173 Mich. App. 88, 91-92,433 N.W.2d
346, 348-49 (1988) (bodily injury is interpreted "to require at least some physical mani
festation of mental injuries"); Artcraft, Inc. v. Lumbennan's Mut. Casualty Co., 126
N.H. 844, 845, 497 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985) (emotional pain of defective mobile home
buyer, lacking any physical manifestations, was not bodily injury covered by liability
policy).
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emotional distress without a physical manifestation-which are typ
ical of many wrongful employment claims-will not invoke cover
age under a CGL policy.
Many courts, however, find coverage when claims for emo
tional distress are accompanied by allegations of a specific physical
injury, such as ulcers or exacerbated hypertension. 3 In other courts,
vague or minimal allegations of physical symptoms may be suffi
cient to trigger bodily injury coverage. 4 A few jurisdictions substan
tially abandoned the physical injury requirement and permit
coverage for emotional distress without any proof of physical injury
or symptoms. s Surprisingly, New York-traditionally conservative
on issues of insurance coverage-is now in the vanguard of this
view. 6
Still, other courts have not focused on the distinction between
physical bodily injury and emotional distress. Rather, they have
elected to examine the basic .core of the allegations in an effort to
determine whether bodily injury coverage per se is triggered re
gardless of any distinction between physical and mental injuries. A
leading decision in this area is Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange,7
which considered the issue of whether allegations of emotional and
physical distress in a suit that was otherwise comprised of claims for
economic loss and non-tangible property damage triggered a duty
. to defend under a general liability policy. The court had little
trouble in following California precedent to the extent that the
physical distress allegations would bring the claim into the realm of

3. See Aim Ins. Co. v. CuJcasi, 280 Cal. Rptr. 766, 774-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991),
review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 2891 (Cal. June 20, 1991); Presidential Hotel v. Canal
Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App. 609, 610, 373 S.E.2d 671,672 (1988); Artcraft, 126 N.H. at 845,
497 A.2d at 1196; E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 Wash.
901,907,726 P.2d 439, 443 (1986).
4. EEOC v. Southern Publishing Co., 894 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1990) (unspecific
allegation of physical pain, in connection with allegations of sexual touching and assault
and battery, held sufficient to constitute bodily injury claim under Mississippi law).
5. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 295 S.C. 349, 350, 368 S.E.2d 477,
478 (under South Carolina law, emotional trauma is bodily injury), affd, 297 S.c. 71,
374 S.E.2d 896 (1988).
6. New York's highest court adopted this view in Lavanant v. General Accident
Ins. Co., 79 N.Y.2d 623, 595 N.E.2d 819 (1992) (holding that term "bodily injury" in an
all-risk liability policy was ambiguous under the circumstances, and allowed coverage of
claims against insured landlord for purely mental or emotional distress and injury). See
also Omark Indus., Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 590 F. Supp. 114 (D. Or. 1984).
7. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), affd, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370, 900 P.2d
619 (1995).
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covered bodily injury.8
The court, however, then proceeded to hold that where the
gravamen of the underlying suit is economic loss, the alleged emo
tional and physical distress is a mere "by-product" of the economic
loss. The court stated that: "We cannot torture the duty to defend
by allowing pleadings of emotional and physical distress resulting
from financial injury to convert uncovered claims for economic
losses into potentially covered claims for bodily injury."9 The court
also rejected the insured's argument that earlier decisions 1o read
into the policy an interdependence between the bodily injury and
property damage coverage in the CGL policy not required by the
policy language itself. The court held that the coverages "are neces
sarily interdependent," but that there would still be bodily injury
coverage in a case where a "plaintiff's physical injuries are not
solely parasitic to the plaintiff's economic losses or other financial
injuries. "11
Waller would seem to support the view that merely tangential
allegations of emotional and/or physical injury should not be deter
minative of coverage. 12 The key, however, is whether or not the
emotional or physical injury derives solely from the alleged eco
nomic loss. Taking employment practice claims as an example. this
may not always be the case, particularly where the emotional dis
tress and/or physical injury is allegedly inflicted before the claimant
is terminated from employment. Nonetheless, Waller and its prog
eny would appear to present the better view in this area, in that
they do not permit coverage to be determined by the fortuity of the
plaintiff's pleading but rather attempt to objectively assess the gra
vamen of the claim.
Resolutions of bodily injury trigger issues are not always well
defined, as illustrated by companion decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1992. In Voorhees v. Preferred
8. Id. at 700 n.6 (citing Aim Ins. Co. v. Culcasi, 280 Cal. Rptr. 766, 772, 776 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991».
9. Id. at 701.
10. See, e.g., Keating v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1993);
McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
11. Waller, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703.
12. Another recent California decision in a vein similar to Waller is also on appeal
to the Supreme Court of California, see Gossard v. Ohio Casualty Group of Ins. Cos.,
35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (no duty to defend on the part of a general
liability insurer where emotional or physical distress that might otherwise be covered is
alleged to be induced by an uncovered economic loss), review granted, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
842, 888 P.2d 236 (1995).
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Mutual Insurance Co. ,13 the court held that plaintiffs claiming emo
tional distress plus vaguely alleged physical manifestations (i.e.,
nausea, headache, depression, and bodily pain) did allege adequate
bodily injury for the purpose of triggering CGL coverage.14 But in
SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 15 the court
held that plaintiffs' claims of emotional anguish and alleged sleep
lessness lacked any sufficient physical manifestations and could not
be bodily injury within the coverage. 16
While the CGL policy permits recovery for property damage in
addition to bodily injury, property damage generally will not in
clude much of the damages sought in a typical discharge claim.
Those damages, such as loss of front and back pay, usually are
viewed by courts as economic damages, which do not Jall under the
coverage definition of property damage in a policyP

B.

The Occurrence Trigger

The typical CGL policy essentially defines an occurrence as an
accident and currently contains as an exclusion-a provision that
the accident cannot be "expected or intended from the standpoint
of the insured." Many wrongful employment practices therefore
may not constitute an occurrence because they do not meet the re
quirement of being unexpected or unintended. Most courts that
have faced this issue have concluded that a wrongful discharge does
not occur accidentally or negligently and therefore cannot be an
occurrence. 18 Similarly, an individual who sexually harasses or as
saults another could not do so accidentally or negligently.19
Society of Mt. Carmel v. National Ben Franklin Insurance
CO.20 is a recent Illinois appellate decision that arose from an un
derlying wrongful termination suit brought by a California high
school teacher. The employer-defendant in the underlying claim
13. 128 N.J. 165, 607 A.2d 1255 (1992).
14. Id. at 180, 607 A.2d at 1262.
15. 128 N.J. 188, 607 A.2d 1266 (1992).
16. Id. at 204-06, 607 A.2d at 1275-76.
17. Mutual Servo Casualty Ins. Co. v. Co-op Supply, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 1438, 1441
42 (D. Mont. 1988) (claim of lost salary and benefits was not covered as property
damage).
18. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. V. Superior Court, 242 Cal. Rptr. 454
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 N.W.2d
192,194-95 (Iowa 1992); John's Cocktail Lounge, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 235 N.J.
Super. 536, 542, 563 A.2d 473, 476 (1989).
19. Chrys A. Martin, Coverage for Claims Arising Out of Employment, FOR THE
DEFENSE, at Sept. 1989.
20. 268 Ill. App. 3d 655, 643 N.E.2d 1280 (1994).
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sought coverage under CGL, workers' compensation, and umbrella
policies issued by the insurer defendants in the coverage action.
The most important issue for the CGL insurers involved the
court's holding as to whether there was a duty to defend under the
CGL policy because of a single count in the underlying complaint
alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress. Citing California
precedent, the court held that a CGL policy offered no coverage for
a wrongful termination claim because the intentional act of termina
tion did not constitute an occurrence under the policy. In address
ing the allegation of negligence, the court held that it was necessary
to "look beyond the pleadings to determine if the allegations of
negligence contained therein are based on separate negligent acts,
or are just merely intentional acts which have been labeled as
negligent. "21
The court continued:
Here Gabriel's [the underlying plaintiff] complaint seeks recov
ery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, the
complaint sets forth no negligent acts or any facts from which
such negligence can be inferred. Rather, the acts upon which
that count is based are the very same acts which underlie every
other count of the [sic] Gabriel's complaint, the intentional dis
charge. Thus, the count alleging negligent infliction of emotional
distress does not constitute an occurrence or accident under the
terms of the comprehensive general liability policy, and the trial
court was incorrect in so finding.22

This is an important decision for CGL insurers to consider be
cause oftentimes even what may somewhat pejoratively be called a
"throwaway" allegation of negligence is argued as a basis for the
CGL insurer to have to defend. While an Illinois court's interpreta
tion of California law would have little authority in California itself,
the court appears to correctly interpret California precedent.
Issues similar to those dealt with in Society of Mt. Carmel were
also resolved in two other significant appellate decisions. In State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Compupay, Inc.,23 a Florida appellate
court considered the availability of coverage under a "business lia
bility insurance policy," which is similar to a standard commercial
general liability form, for claims arising from sexual harassment and
sex discrimination. The court determined that discrimination and
21. Mt. Carmel, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 667-68, 643 N.E.2d at 1289.
22. Id. at 668, 643 N.E.2d at 1289.
23. 654 So. 2d 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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harassment were akin to sexual abuse in that there·is an inherent
intent to harm the victim and that they are thus intentional acts as a
matter of law without regard to the alleged, subjective intent of the
abuser or harasser. 24 Finding that the employer-insured here was
well aware of the conduct of the harasser, the court appeared not to
give any weight to the fact that the underlying plaintiff pled at least
one count of negligence based upon the employer's decision to con
tinue to retain the harasser in its employ.
In a very succinct memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals
of New York has also found there to be no coverage under a gen
eralliability policy for an incident involving the shooting of an off
duty police officer by a night club security guard. 25 While not an
employment-related case, the court's decision is instructive and rel
evant. Suit was brought against both the security guard and his em
ployer, Val-Blue. The allegations against the employer were based
upon respondeat superior, negligent hiring, negligent supervision,
and negligent training. The policy contained the following exclu
sionary provision: "It is agreed that no coverage shall apply under
this policy for any claim, demand or suit based on Assault and Bat
tery and Assault and Battery shall not be deemed an accident,
whether or not committed by or at the direction of the insured."26
Disregarding the allegations of negligence, the court held that the
policy provided no coverage finding that "[t]he injury being sued
upon here is an assault and battery. The plethora of claims sur
rounding that injury, including those for 'negligent shooting' and
'negligent hiring and supervision' are all 'based on' that assault and
battery without which [the plaintiff) would have no cause of
action. "27
As in the cases exploring the bodily injury trigger noted above,
decisions such as Society of Mt. Carmel, Compupay, and Val-Blue
evidence a willingness of the courts to look beyond the allegations
framed within the four comers of a complaint and not allow a "neg
ligent tail" to wag the "intentional dog." The issue of whether or
not an event happens to qualify as an occurrence under the policy is
related to whether or not that same event, or at least a claim arising
24. Id. See also Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sky, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 249 (W.D.
Ark. 1992).
25. U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Val-Blue Corp., 85 N.Y.2d 821, 647 N.E.2d 1342
(1995).
26. Id. at 822, 647 N.E.2d at 1343 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 823, 647 N.E.2d at 1344.
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from that event, may be uninsurable because it involves intentional
wrongdoing.
In many respects, the first significant piece of federal employ
ment-related civil rights legislation enacted since the Reconstruc
tion Era following the Civil War was ntle VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Even before Title VII became law, the Insurance De
partment of the State of New York had issued a pronouncement in
1963 to the effect that insurance coverage for discrimination-based
liability "may not lawfully be written under the New York Insur
ance Law."28 New York's prohibition was broad and sweeping, ex
tending not only to coverage for any judgment or settlement
amounts but also to the costs of defending such claims while the
allegations remained unsubstantiated in fact.
Over thirty years later, on May 31, 1994, this wall erected by
the Insurance Department was substantially demolished when it is
sued its Circular Letter No.6 (1994).29 The department's two-page
letter provided that insurance for disparate impact type discrimina
tion, as well as discrimination for which one is only vicariously lia
ble, is now permissible.
Many EPLI insurers have now begun to offer their policies to
New York domiciled insureds. No other jurisdictions had absolute
prohibitions similar to New York. As a result of this circular letter,
EPLI is now available on a nationwide basis. Some insurers, how
ever, have voluntarily elected not to write business in certain states
where they perceive there to be unfavorable law and/or hostile jury
biases regarding suits against employers.
In many respects, the new position of the insurance depart
ment in New York is similar to what has been established by statute
in California by way of section 533 of the California Insurance
Code ("section 533").30 That statute was recently construed in a
decision rendered by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California in Save Mart Supermarkets v. Un
derwriters at Lloyd's London. 31
The Save Mart court held that discrimination as a result of dis
parate treatment, as opposed to disparate impact, w~s uninsurable
under section 533. The court reasoned that "unintentional discrimi
28. Opinion of the New York Superintendent of Insurance (September 26, 1963).
29. New York Insurance Department Circular Letter No.6, Insurance Coverage
for Discrimination Claims based upon Disparate Impact and Vicarious Liability (May
31, 1994).
30. CAL. INS. CoDE § 533 (West 1982).
31. 843 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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nation may be inherently harmful, but a plaintiff need not establish
that the insured intended to commit a wrongful act in order to re
cover under such a theory."32 Stated another way, it is the inten
tional nature of the result which runs afoul of section 533 and not
the mere intentional nature of the act itself. While the policy at
issue in Save Mart was a general liability policy, and the underlying
litigation involved allegations of retaliatory discharge, constructive
discharge, and employment-related sex and age discrimination, the
issues therein may arise in any number of policies and factual
scenarios.
Section 533 is, in a sense, a statutory exclusion that must be
read into every insurance policy to the effect that "[a]n insurer is
not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured."33 The
Save Man court examined the earlier California Supreme Court de
cision in 1. C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co. v. M.K.,34 which held
that if an act is inherently harmful, section 533 requires only a show
ing of intent to engage in the harmful conduct to preclude coverage.
1. C. Penney involved child molestation, and California courts since
have found several other types of conduct to be inherently harmful,
and hence uninsurable, under section 533. Examples include: (1)
knowing inducement of patent infringement;35 (2) sexual harass
ment;36 (3) malicious prosecution;37 (4) intentional exposure of sex
ual partner to HIV;38 (5» knowing conspiracy to unlawfully restrain
trade;39 (6) racially motivated hate crime;40 (7) sexual assault;41 and
(8) wrongful termination based on racial discrimination and union
32. Id. at 606.
33. CAL. INS. CoDE § 533.
34. 278 Cal. Rptr. 64,804 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1991).
35. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (commonly known as the "Watercloud" decision).
36. Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993). This decision cannot necessarily be read as holding that sexual harassment
is universally inherently harmful conduct that falls within the proscription of section
533. It should be noted that in Coit the :primary harasser and defendant was the CEO
and sole Shareholder in the corporate entity. Thus, there was not pled, and arguably
could not have been pled, any theory of recovery against the corporation or individual
manager in the nature of negligent supervision or negligent hiring.
37. California Casualty Mgt. Co. v. Martocchio, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Cal. o.
App.1993).
38. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Sheft, 989 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1993).
39. Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 791 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
40. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tankovich, 776 F. Supp. 1394 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
41. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Ezrin, 764 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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activities. 42 In finding the discrimination at issue in Save Mart to be
in the nature of disparate impact, the court concluded that the pol
icy of discouraging willful torts would not be furthered by applying
section 533 to exclude coverage.
While both California (by way of Save Mart) and New York
(by way of the Insurance Department's circular letter) now clearly
hold disparate impact discrimination to be insurable, this may be of
little practical consequence in that most experienced observers in
this area would agree that disparate treatment claims occur with
proportionately much greater frequency than disparate impact
claims. Of greater practical significance is the New York Insurance
Department's position, discussed above, regarding vicarious liabil
ity of an employer for discriminatory acts of its employees. This
would appear to greatly expand the number of situations in which
the employer may be afforded insurance coverage despite the inten
tional and likely uninsurable misconduct of its employees.
The section 533 analysis of Save Mart should have applicability
to any liability insurance policy. Many other jurisdictions would
likewise apply a similar analysis where there may be a similar stat
ute or insurance department regulation in place, as well as applica
ble case law.
Perhaps the most significant recent development in the area of
insurability of intentional misconduct is a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit applying Alaska law. 43
Although there was some unusual policy language at issue that ar
guably supported the result, the decision is particularly noteworthy
because it is a rare instance of a court finding insurance coverage in
a situation involving sexual abuse of a minor.
The Ninth Circuit noted Alaska public policy against insuring a
person against liability for his or her intentional acts.44 Nonethe
less, the court was willing to make an exception in situations where
the purpose of the insurance is to compensate innocent third parties
for injuries caused by intentional misconduct. 45 It further held that
making such an exception is particularly appropriate when the
42. B&E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992). While not expressed by the court in such tenns, B&E would be a
situation more in the nature of a disparate treatment case than the disparate impact
scenario in Save Mart.
43. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., 55 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1995).
44. Id. at 1423 (citing Dairy Queen v. Travelers Indem. Co., 748 P.2d 1169
(Alaska 1988»).
45. Id.
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existence of the insurance is unlikely to have been an inducement
to the insured to engage in the intentional misconduct. 46 The court
thus held that "[p]ublic policy concerns against allowing [the in
sured who engaged in intentional misconduct] to avoid civil liability
by reason of insurance coverage are outweighed by the advantages
of assuring that his victim[s] ... will be compensated for the injuries
[he] .caused. "47
C.

The Personal Injury Trigger

The CGL policy also may be enhanced by the payment of an
additional premium to provide coverage for certain kinds of per
sonal injury-usually defined as injury arising from specified of
fenses such as libel, slander, or disparagement-that violate an
individual's right of privacy.48 Although possibly not intended, per
sonal injury coverage may be applicable to wrongful employment
practice claims, such as allegations of defamation in connection
with an employee's termination or violation of the employee's right
of privacy.49 Similar broad coverage for "personal injury" may also
be found in the employer's umbrella and excess coverage policy. In
many excess coverage policies, personal injury is defined specifi
cally to include discrimination.50
Courts have generally viewed personal injury coverage as in
suring against a broader type of injury than bodily injury policies.
The result was that courts construed the language of such umbrella
or excess policies as affording both coverage and defense for claims
46. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that Alaska had yet specifically to
address this exception in the context of a sexual abuse or assault claim, it did note that
other jurisdictions have recognized such an exception. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 222 Conn. 823,610 A.2d 1281 (1992) (sexual assault by a dentist);
Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 114 Mich. App. 683, 319 N.W.2d 382 (1982) (sexual abuse
by psychiatrist).
47. St. Paul, 55 F.3d at 1424.
48. A typical broad form comprehensive liability endorsement covering "Per
sonal Injury," used with a CGL policy, is described in Federal Ins. Co. v. Cablevision
Sys. Dev. Co., 637 F. Supp. 1568, 1573 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). See also H.W. RUBIN, DIC·
TIONARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 308 (2d ed. 1991).
49. See Raoul D. Kennedy & James A. Roberts, Insurance Coverage For Wrong
ful Termination Claims, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 654,661 (1995).
50. Id. at 662-63. See, e.g., Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F.
Supp. 565, 567 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (policy covered personal injury; defined as including
injury from discrimination); Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. Assocs., 492
N.W.2d 675, 676 n.3, 668-79 (Iowa 1992) (contractors' umbrella policy defined personal
injury to include discrimination and humiliation; the court held that an act of discrimi
nation although intentional, was required to be covered under Iowa's doctrine of rea
sonable expectations).
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of purely emotional distress that may come within the broader defi
nition of personal injury.51 However, because personal injury cov
erage is defined by the type of acts causing the claimed injury (i.e.,
defamation), such coverage will probably not cover most claims of
wrongful discharge, discrimination, or sexual harassment unless
such acts and terms are specifically included in the policy. More
over, even in the absence of an occurrence requirement, the insurer
still can question the insurability of any alleged wrongful employ
ment practice that was arguably intentional or criminal. Thus, per
sonal injury coverage is no panacea to the employer.
D. Implication of the Insurer's Duty to Defend
The insurer's obligation under the typical CGL policy is two
fold: (i) to defend the insured in any lawsuit or proceeding alleging
a covered claim; and (ii) to indemnify the insured for any insurable
damages arising from a covered claim. The insured needs to know
whether it can rely on this duty to defend, and to what extent.
It often is said that the duty to defend is broader than the duty
to indemnify. Thus, "an insurer must defend a suit whenever it as
certains facts within or without the complaint that give rise to the
potential of liability under the policy."52 In most states (California
is one exception),53 an insurer need not defend if "the complaint
unambiguously alleges noncovered conduct on the part of the in
sured, even if the facts alleged would permit amendment or con
struction under a different theory which would be covered. "54 If
the insurer can "exclude the possibility of a recovery" for which the
policy provides coverage, there may be no duty to defend. 55
51. See, e.g., Westfield Ins. Co. v. TWT, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 492, 494 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (applying California law, insurer under COL and excess policy was liable for cov
erage and defense on cross-claim for emotional distress caused by negligence); Morri
son Assurance Co. v. North Am. Reinsurance Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (N.D. Ala.
1984) (mental anguish resulting from strip mining damage to farm property is personal
injury), affd without op., 760 F.2d 279 (11th Cir. 1985); American States Ins. Co. v.
Cooper, 518 So. 2d 708, 710 (Ala. 1987) (under Alabama law, an insurer under COL
policy was liable for coverage and defense of claims by purchasers against insured ven
dors of apartment complexes for alleged misrepresentation, alleging mental anguish);
Stanback v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 68 N.C. App. 107, 115, 314 S.E.2d 775, 779-80
(1984).
52. Westfield, 723 F. Supp. at 495.
53. Montrose Chern. Corp. v. Superior Court (Canadian Universal), 24 Cal. Rptr.
2d 467, 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1993) (duty to defend even if the only facts upon which duty
arises are extrinsic to the complaint).
54. Federal Ins. Co. v. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co., 637 F. Supp. 1568, 1578
(E.D.N.Y. 1986).
55. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Atlanta Int'I Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp. 80, 83 (D. Mass.
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Circumstances may arise, depending on the policy terms, in
which the CGL insurer does have a duty to defend or pay for de
fense against third-party claims that are potentially within its cover
age, though no indemnity could be obtained for any award (i.e.,
where indemnity would be prohibited by statute or public policy).56
However, as suggested in a recent California decision s7 that denied
defense costs where the claim was uninsurable under a California
statute prohibiting indemnification for willful conduct, the policy
must expressly provide or contemplate the payment of defense
costs under those circumstances:
[I]f an insured either expressly purchases a defense without re
gard to indemnification (e.g., a litigation policy) or is led by the
terms of the insurance agreement, whether those terms be clear
or ambiguous, to reasonably expect a defense to the type of claim
asserted, then a defense may be required evert though there can
legally be no duty to indemnify ....58

E. CGL Coverage for EEOC and Similar Agency Proceedings
Employers also need to be concerned with the issue of whether
the CGL defense obligation extends to enforcement actions or pro
ceedings that do not necessarily seek an award of actual money
damages, such as charges of discrimination brought before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). These
proceedings can be arduous, if not costly, to handle and may re
quire lawyers possessing special familiarity with the various laws,
1992) (duty to defend insured against claims of blatant and intentional racial discrimina
tion was barred as matter of public policy); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1499 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd on reh'g, 748 F.2d 760 (2d
Cir. 1984); B&E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (under workers' compensation policy requiring the insurer to de
fend claims for "injuries insured against under this policy," the court could conceive of
"no rational construction" by which the insured reasonably could expect to be defended
against claims of wrongful discharge committed in retaliation for an employee's refusal
to implement an illegal plan to replace American workers with Ftlipinos to defeat union
in violation of labor and civil rights laws).
56. See, e.g., Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 215-16,
846 P.2d 792, 797-98 (Cal. 1993) (insurer has duty to defend "if any claim encompassed
within (underlying action) potentially may be covered" and permitting defense cover
age for parasexual conduct leading to molestation).
57. B&E Convalescent Ctr., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909.
58. Id. See also Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 113,419 P.2d 168, 177
(Cal. 1966) (en banc) (upholding coverage and duty to defend under homeowner's pol
icy against assault claim; construing California statute as forbidding contract to indem
nify for loss from willful wrongdoing but not contract to defend against accusation).
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statutes, regulations, and procedures. For example, an advers~
EEOC probable cause determination may have an impact on the
employer's future liability. Although not preclusive in any subse
quent federal action brought by the EEOC or by the aggrieved em
ployee, a probable cause determination may still be admissible
evidence against the employer. 59
The CGL policy, after stating that the insurer will pay those
sums "that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as dam~
ages," defines the insurer's duty to defend with the caveat: "We
will have the right and duty to defend any suit seeking those dam
ages."60 An EEOC proceeding obviously is not a "suit seeking
those damages" or any damages, and the insurer may have no duty
to defend. 61
One New Jersey appellate decision specifically held that an in
surer under a CGL policy had no duty to defend a discrimination
proceeding before the EEOC because the EEOC conciliation pro
cess is not "a coercive, adversarial proceeding."62 This reflects a
more general rule that mere investigations and inquiries, which do
not impose liability directly, will not trigger CGL coverage. 63

F. Employment-Related Exclusions
The CGL policy typically contains an exclusion for injury aris
ing in the scope of the employment relationship, primarily to avoici
any overlap with workers' compensation and similar coverage. This
exclusion also may restrict or prevent its coverage of employment
practices claims. 64
59. Whatley v. Skaggs Cos. Inc., 707 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1983) (admis
sion of EEOC investigator's detennination not reversible error because not given
preclusive effect); Smith v. Universal Servs., Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 158 (5th Cir. 1972)
(EEOC report and finding of probable cause held admissible under federal law).
60. Commercial General Liability Coverage Fonn § I, Coverage A.l (a).
61. Cf Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988)
(general liability policies generally cover legal damages but do not extend coverage to
claims for equitable relief-insurer had no duty to defend environmental clean-up sui~
by U.S. government).
62. Campbell Soup Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 A.2d 969 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div.), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 230 (N.J. 1990).
63. See Winkler v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (9th Cir.
1991) (merely threatened suit did not constitute a claim under a D&O liability policy).
64. Employee exclusions and other similar manuscripted exclusions have bec01lle
more popular in recent years as employment practices claims proliferate. Two exam
ples of such exclusions recently were upheld in Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive
Health Care Assocs., Inc., 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993). The first exclusion, which the
court referred to as a sexual abuse exclusion, stated:
In consideration of the premium charged, it is agreed that such coverage as is
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Unfortunately, it is not always clear when employment-prac
tices claims arise in the scope of the employment relationship. Case
law is split as to whether injuries suffered from an alleged wrongful
discharge arise from employment-related injury or after the em
ployment relationship was terminated. For example, and taking the
sublime to the ridiculous, perhaps coverage could depend on
whether the employer said, "you're a stupid and incompetent jerk
and you're fired" (arguably not covered because the insult occurred
during employment), or "you're fired, you stupid and incompetent
jerk" (possibly covered because the insult occurred post
employment)!
Within the last few years, general liability insurers have begun
to use a generic and very broad employment-related claims exclu
sion. A sample of this exclusionary language which is added to the
policy by endorsement is attached as an appendix to this Article.
Although the exclusion has yet to be interpreted by the courts, it
would appear to be broad enough to exclude coverage in virtually
any wrongful termination, discrimination, or sexual harassment
claim. As such, many of the decisions discussed above that suggest
the possibility of CGL insurance coverage for these claims may be
of little practical comfort when one is faced with a CGL policy en
dorsed with the new exclusionary wording.
II.

D&O

LIABILITY COVERAGE

Under a typical D&O policy, a corporation's directors and of
ficers are covered for wrongful acts committed in their capacities as
provided by this policy shall not apply to any claim, demand and causes of
action arising out of, or resulting from, either physical abuse, sexual abuse or
licentiousness, immoral or sexual behavior intended to lead to, or culminating
in any sexual act, whether caused by, or at the instigation of, or at the direction
of, or omission by, the Insured, his employees, patrons or any causes
whatsoever.
Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
The second exclusion, an employment-related claim exclusion, stated:
It is understood and agreed that:
1. The policy does not provide any insurance coverage with respect to any
claim, demand or causes of action arising out of or resulting from wrongful
discharge, retaliatory discharge or any claim arising from the employment re
lationship between the insured and any of its employees, and allegations of
such, whether caused by, or at the instigation of, or at the direction of, or
omission by, the Insured, his employees, or any causes whatsoever.
2. The Company has no duty under the policy to defend the insured with re
spect to any claim, demand or cause of action of the sort described under
paragraph 1 ....
Id; (alteration in the original).
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such, and the corporation is reimbursed for indemnifying them.
There is no single standard 0&0 policy form, unlike as is the case
with the standard CGL policy form. It is noted that 0&0 policies
"vary from insurer to insurer and in many instances these variations
are significant and material."65
Most claims against directors and officers are brought by the
corporation's shareholders and commonly involve securities dis
putes. An increasing number of claims, however, now are made by
employees of the corporation. 66 Because most 0&0 policies ex
clude claims for personal injury or bodily injury,67 there would be
no coverage under those policies for wrongful employment prac
tices claims to the extent those claims are premised on bodily or
personal injury allegations.
Many wrongful employment practices claims rarely would pro
vide a legitimate basis for a claim against a director because a direc
tor would not have the type of day-to-day responsibility for the
operation of the company's business that could subject him or her
to personal liability for those claims. Moreover, many of these
claims are not likely to involve officers, particularly in a large cor
porate organization.68 Nevertheless, officers may be frequent
targets of these claims in smaller organizations where they have
more direct involvement in hiring and firing decisions over all em
ployees, or where claims may be premised upon negligence in al
lowing a pattern of discrimination or sexual harassment to exist
within the company.
Of course, a particularly egregious and expensive underlying
65. Joseph P. Monteleone, D&O Insurance: Timing of Payments of Defense Ex
penses, in DIRECfORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE 265-64 (PLI Comm.
Course Handbook Series No. A 535, 1990). Other observers likewise noted "considera
ble differences in important exclusionary and coverage endorsements" among D&O
policies available in the market. David B. Parker & Lance A. Selfridge, Current Cover
age Issues in Director and Officers Insurance, in INSURANCE EXCESS AND REINSUR.
ANCE CoVERAGE DISPUTES 743 (PLI Litig. Course Handbook Series No. H405, 1991).
66. Thomas W. Hyland & Wayne E. Borgeest, Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance: An Introduction to the Coverage, Claims and Current Issues, in INSURANCE
EXCESS AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 707, 708 (PLI Litig. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. H405, 1991).
67. See Parker & Selfridge, supra note 63, at 770.
68. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recently held that corporate officers and directors
cannot be liable for claims alleging age and sexual discrimination arising under the .
ADEA and Title VII. See Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied sub nom, Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); cf Lamirande v.
RTC, 834 F. Supp. 526, 529 (D.N.R. 1993) (officer may be deemed to be agent of the
corporate employer if he or she exercises significant control over the alleged discrimina
tion victim's hiring, firing, or conditions of employment).
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sexual harassment or discrimination problem may well give rise to
shareholder derivative litigation, as was the case in the recent situa
tion involving Del Laboratories and its chief executive, Dan K.
Wassong. 69
Even if a claim is asserted against an officer, the question may
arise as to whether that individual is sued in his or her capacity as
an officer. Most D&O policies limit their coverage solely to suits
against insured individuals in insured capacities. Though not a case
involving D&O insurance, a recent decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit highlights the insured capacity
issue.7° Although most of the opinion deals with the issue of per
sonal jurisdiction over the archdiocese and parish that employed a
priest accused both civilly and criminally of homosexual relations
with a minor, the analysis there was also applied to deny any de
fense obligations on the part of the archdiocese's insurer to the
priest.
In short summary, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff, a
minor, could not get personal jurisdiction over a Louisiana archdio
cese and parish in an action brought in Mississippi arising from acts
that took place at one of their "employed" priest's home in Missis
sippi. Although this case is arguably sui generis because of the na
ture of a priest's employment relationship with his diocese and
parish, it raises some interesting issues that must be considered in
any employment-related claim vis-a-vis both liability and insurance.
First, the fact that the illicit acts occurred in the priest's private
residence while not "on duty" was dispositive as to both the issues
involving personal jurisdiction over the diocese and parish, as well
as the diocese's insurer's obligation to defend the priest. Second,
the abhorrent nature of the priest's conduct was found to take his
conduct outside the scope of his employment. While it may be ar
gued that the religious and moral missions of the diocese and parish
were of particular significance to this finding, the court's rational
could also be applied, for example, to allegations of sexual harass
ment and/or discrimination in the work place. To wit, is it ever
within the scope of one's employment to sexually harass female em
69. See Del Laboratories Inc.: Holder's Suit Says Officials Liable in Harassment
Case, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1995, at AS, wherein it was reported that such a derivative
action has been filed subsequent to a $1.2M settlement of sexual harassment claims
brOUght by the EEOC on behalf of 15 female employees of Del Laboratories.
70. TIchenor v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, 32
F.3d 953, 963-64 (5th Cir. 1994).
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ployees or discriminate against racial minority employees?71
Even if there is D&O coverage for the claim against a director
or officer, that coverage does not extend to the corporate entity.
The corporation is not insured directly for its own liability or de
fense but is only insured to the extent it indemnifies its directors or
officers. 72
Although the issues of rescission of the policy or denial of cov
erage based upon misrepresentations in the application for the pol
icy are not particular to D&O policies, D&O insurers will no doubt
scrutinize the application for possible misrepresentations whenever
a claim is presented during the policy period with indications that
the circumstances which gave rise to the claim were known to the
insured(s) at the time of the application and should have been dis
closed in response to one or more pertinent questions on the
application.
Illustrative of this problem is a recent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which arose from an
underlying sexual harassment and employment discrimination
claim,73 Coverage was sought under both a CGL and Public Offi
cials and Employees Liability Insurance ("PO&E") Policy issued to
71. A recent Arizona case explores this interesting issue. In State, v. Schallock,
196 Ariz. Adv. Rptr. 35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995), the principle issue decided was whether a
state agency, the Arizona Prosecuting Attorney's Advisory Council ("APAAC"), had
lin indemnification obligation to its subordinate director ("Heinze") for damages result
ing from his sexual harassment of subordinate female state employees. APAAC's own
liability for arguably being negligent, or worse in creating or tolerating a hostile work
environment, was not at issue.
Under an applicable state self-insured statute, Heinze would only be entitled to
indemnity for conduct in the course and scope of his employment. The court found that
the conduct at issue, which ranged from offensive and obscene language and sexually
offensive touching to, in one instance, rape, was certainly sufficient to take such conduct
outside the course and scope of employment. Accordingly, the court held that Heinze
was not entitled to indemnification.
In the court's analysis of applicable Arizona law, it determined that an employee's
acts occurs within the course and scope of employment only if: "(i) it is of the kind he
or she is employed to perform; (ii) it occurs substantially within authorized time and
space limits; [and] (iii) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master
[employer)." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957); Pose v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 158 Ariz. 36,38, 760 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988».
Given this tripartite test, it is relatively easy to appreciate why one employee's
sexual harassment of another can never be within the course and scope of employment.
72. Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 661 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (D & 0 policies do not cover liability or defense costs of the corporation itself).
A D & 0 policy occasionally may be endorsed to provide coverage for the corporate
entity, but this usually is limited to certain not-for-profit businesses.
73. Board of County Comm'rs v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. 93
3417, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 27870 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 1994).
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the plaintiff county government. The PO&E policy is substantively
similar to a D&O policy.
Many of the coverage issues were resolved in favor of the de
fendant CGL and PO&E insurers based upon the nature of the re
lationship between the county sheriff's department, where the
underlying plaintiff was employed, and the board of county
commissioners.
What is most significant is the court's disposition of the issue of
misrepresentation on the PO&E application. While denial of cov
erage and especially rescission is always difficult to establish based
upon application misrepresentations and/or breaches of warranty,
the court's holding, essentially set forth verbatim below, illustrates
the relative ease of denying coverage and/or rescinding where there
is no severability and no intentionality requirement under applica
ble law.
In Board of County Commissioners, the Board applied for a
one year policy renewal and agreed under section 1O(c) of its
PO&E policy in August 1990. The Board agreed that:
[n]o fact, circumstance or situation indicating the probability of a
claim or action is now known to any Public Official or Employee;
and it is agreed by all concerned that if there be knowledge of
any such fact, circumstance, or situation, any claim or action sub
sequently emanating therefrom shall be excluded from coverage
under the insurance here being applied for .... Despite its agree
ment to this exclusion, the Board failed to notify [the insurer] at
the time that the policy was being renewed that "troubles were
brewing" in the Sheriff's Department, where a public employee
had already filed two complaints with federal and state civil
rights agencies over sexual harassment and sex discrimination.
There is no suggestion that the Board consciously withheld infor
mation from [the insurer]. Rather, it is mutually agreed that the
failure to disclose resulted from Commissioner Bell's innocent ig
norance of the emerging problem. Nevertheless, the sheriff is a
"public official" in Holmes County, and that public official knew
very well, at the time that the Board applied for renewal of the
PO&E policy, that a claim or action was probable. Conse
quently, the district court correctly found that section IO(c) of the
policy excluded from coverage all claims for indemnification that
"emanate" from the [underlying plaintiff's] action. 74

The D&O policy, as a "clainis made" policy, also presents is
74.

Id. at *18-19.
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sues as to when a claim is first deemed to have been made in vari
ous employment-related claim situations. The issue is particularly
troublesome if the policy at issue does not precisely define the term
"claim" or provide a determination as to when a claim is deemed to
have been first made. Some policies are very specific in this regard,
utilizing language similar to the following:
"Claim" shall mean: (a) a judicial or other proceeding that is filed
against a Director and/or Officer and in which such Director and/
or Officer could be subject to a binding adjudication of liability
for compensatory money damages or other civil relief, or (b) a
written demand from one or more parties alleging that such Di
rector and/or Officer should have liability to such parties for
compensatory money damages or other civil relief.
A Claim shall be deemed to have been first made on the
date that a summons or similar document is first served upon any
Director and/or Officer, or on the date that any Director and/or
Officer first receives a written demand as defined herein, which
ever date first occurs,75

When policies are silent or less precise, however, problems
similar to those visited in a recent Illinois decision arise.76 In that
case there was an issue as to whether an EEOC charge of age dis
crimination was covered under any of two successive claims made
"school leaders" D&O policies. The first policy was a National
Union policy scheduled to run from July 1, 1988-91, but which was
canceled effective July 1, 1990. It was replaced by a Scottsdale In
surance Company policy effective July 1, 1990.
The underlying factual chronology is as follows:
June 22, 1990- underlying claimant teacher makes complaint of age
discrimination to EEOC.
June 25, 1990- EEOC mails Notice of Charge of Discrimination to
insured school district, but the Charge is non-specific as
to which employee is filing the charge and specifically
advises that "[n]o action is required on your part at this
time."
June 27, 1990- the insured receives the June 25 Notice.
June 28, 1990- insured sends Notice and cover letter to its broker.
75. Language used by endorsement to Reliance Insurance Company D & 0 pol
icy form.
76. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Cary Community Sch. Dist. No. 26, No. 93 C
6526,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1846, (N.D. 111., Feb. 14, 1995).
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insured receives a second Notice from the EEOC.
This Notice contains a copy of charge dated and
signed by the claimant teacher as of July 2, 1990.

Notice of the matter (which ultimately proceeded into suit on
October 1, 1990) was initially given to National Union some time
after July 1, 1990, but the court's opinion is not specific as to when
tbis occurred. National Union began to provide a defense because
its personnel were unaware that the policy had been canceled
effective July 1, 1990. Realizing their error, National Union, and
perhaps the insured as well, appear to have tendered the defense of
the suit to Scottsdale. Upon Scottsdale's refusal to defend on the
basis that this was a claim made before inception of their policy, the
coverage litigation ensued.
The court noted that the Scottsdale policy did not contain a
definition of "claim" and essentially adopted the common
definition that has been developed through case law, i.e., "a
demand for money or property as of right." The court in particular
relied upon Bensalem Township v. Western World Insurance CO.,77
which held that an EEOC charge of discrimination did not
constitute a claim in the context of a claims made insurance policy.
Holding that the claim here was first made after July 1, 1990,
the court noted that the June 25, 1990 EEOC notice contained no
specific charge document and also contained the above-quoted "no
action" language. It was further noted that the underlying claimant
continued to be employed until December 1990 and thus had no
claim for money damages, which in any case, the EEOC would not
have the power to award. Also, money damages could not be
recovered in a civil suit at that time (1990), which was prior to the
implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Scottsdale also argued that even if the claim was first made in
its policy period, it was excluded from coverage by virtue of a policy
exclusion which provided it had no obligation to make payment on
or defend any claim "arising from any circumstance(s) or
incident(s) which might give rise to a claim hereunder, which is
known to the INSURED prior to the inception of the policy and
not disclosed to the Company prior to inception . . . ."78
The court noted that the application for the Scottsdale policy
had been dated May 8,1990, and the so-called warranty question as
to "knowledge of any act, error, omission, or breach of duty which
77. 609 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
78. National, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1846, *9.
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may reasonably give rise to a claim" had been answered in the
:p.egative,79 The application did not provide for any continuing
~bligation to disclose information, such as an EEOC notice, up to
the time the policy incepts. The court held that "[i]t would be
llnreasonable to impose such an obligation on an insured without
giving advance notice of specific contract language so requiring. "80
Accordingly, it was held that the exclusion was inapplicable to the
EEOC notice received by the insured after the date of the
application but prior to the policy inception date.
CONCLUSION

Employment-related litigation has substantially increased over
the past few years. This rise in litigation has created questions
about whether insurance policies cover claims such as wrongful dis
charge, discrimination, and harassment. Although EPLI is in
tended to cover such claims, many employers have not purchased
EPLI because it is relatively new. For this reason, many employers
must rely on other forms of insurance coverage.
CGL, umbrella coverage, and D&O policies may provide em
ployers with insurance coverage for the types of claims that EPLI is
intended to cover. However, whether CGL and D&O policies
cover claims such as wrongful discharge, discrimination, and harass
rpent depends upon a number of issues involving policy interpreta
tion. Under any given factual circumstance, an employer may find
*elf without coverage for an employment-related claim. There
fore, employers should examine their insurance policies and con
sider whether they are adequately protected or whether they would
be better served by securing an alternative form of coverage such as
EPLI.

79. Id. at *15-16.
80. Id. at *16.
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APPENDIX
CL 701
(10-93)
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY.
PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.
CG 21471093
EMPLOYMENT-RELATED
PRACTICES EXCLUSION
This endorsement modifies Insurance provided under the
following:
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART
A. The following exclusion is added to paragraph 2., Exclusions
of COVERAGE A- BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE LIABILITY (Section I-Coverages):
This Insurance does not apply to:
"Bodily injury" to:
(1) A person arising out of any:
(a) Refusal to employ that person;
(b) Termination of that person's employment; or
(c) Employment-related practices, policies, acts or omis
sions, such as coercion, demotion, evaluation, reassignment,
discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation or discrimi~
nation directed at that person; or
(2) The spouse, child, parent, brother or sister of that person as a
consequence of "bodily injury" to that person at whom any of the
employment-related practices described in paragraphs (a), (b) or
(c) above is directed.

This exclusion applies:
(1) Whether the insured may be liable as an employer or in any
other capacity; and
(2) To any obligation to share damages with or repay someone
else who must pay damages because of the injury.

B. The following exclusion is added to paragraph 2., Exclusions
of COVERAGE B-PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY
LIABILITY (Section I-Coverages):
This Insurance does not apply to:
"Personal injury" to:
(1) A person arising out of any:
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(a) Refusal to employ that person;
(b) Termination of that person's employment; or
(c) Employment-related practices, policies, acts or omis
sions, such as coercion, demotion, evaluation, reassignment,
discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation or discrimi
nation directed at that person; or
(2) The spouse, child, parent, brother or sister of that person as a
consequence of "personal injury" to that person at whom any of
the employment-related practices described in paragraphs (a),
(b) or (c) above is directed.

This exclusion applies:
(1) Whether the insured may be liable as an employer or in any
other capacity; and
(2) To any obligation to share damages with or repay someone
else who must pay damages because of the injury.
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